THE MORAL FOUNDATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AS AN OBSTACLE TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF MINORITIES RIGHTS

The purpose of this paper is to question the moral foundation as a platform for the claim and creation of minorities rights, that is to say, the widespread idea that the normative force of human rights will seek its foundation in moral. In addition to all the problems that a moral approach to rights raises, specifically in the area of minority rights it is precisely the moral that will represent the most powerful obstacle to its implementation, because: - the moral and the abstract universal concepts to which it connects are epistemological barriers; - many of the rights of minorities find in the body their platform of claim, which morality interdicts through various strategies of depreciation of the body; - in a neoliberal world, the moral argument of merit is articulated with a new rationality that produces systematic competition between individuals, excluding a large number of vulnerable groups and individuals. We start from the premise that minority rights are not the moral achievements of humankind but rather the political achievements of social movements that write the social history of human rights, that is, from the fact that minority rights must be written and rewritten every day, are not a priori moral. Briefly, it is necessary to face the legitimating status of morality itself, beyond the usual discussions about redistribution and recognition. The methodology will consist of bibliographical review on the subject and the analysis of some empirical data, with incursions in the fields of law, philosophy of law and sociology.