Anti-psychologism about Necessity: Friedrich Albert Lange on Objective Inference

被引:2
|
作者
Patton, Lydia [1 ]
机构
[1] Virginia Tech, Dept Philosophy, Blacksburg, VA 24061 USA
关键词
PHILOSOPHY;
D O I
10.1080/01445340.2010.541183
中图分类号
B82 [伦理学(道德学)];
学科分类号
摘要
In the nineteenth century, the separation of naturalist or psychological accounts of validity from normative validity came into question. In his 1877 Logical Studies (Logische Studien), Friedrich Albert Lange argues that the basis for necessary inference is demonstration, which takes place by spatially delimiting the extension of concepts using imagined or physical diagrams. These diagrams are signs or indications of concepts' extension, but do not represent their content. Only the inference as a whole captures the objective content of the proof. Thus, Lange argues, the necessity of an inference is independent of psychological accounts of how we grasp the content of a proposition.
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页码:139 / 152
页数:14
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