Maximum-revenue tariffs versus free trade

被引：3
|
作者：
Collie, David R. [1 ]
机构：
[1] Cardiff Univ, Cardiff Business Sch, Cardiff, Wales
来源：
SCOTTISH JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY | 2020年 / 67卷 / 04期
关键词：
Bertrand oligopoly; Cournot oligopoly; free trade; maximum-revenue tariff; perfect competition; OPTIMUM-WELFARE;
D O I：
10.1111/sjpe.12245
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
Welfare with the maximum-revenue tariff is compared to free-trade welfare under Cournot duopoly with differentiated products; under Bertrand duopoly with differentiated products; and under perfect competition in the case of a large country able to affect its terms of trade. Under Cournot duopoly and Bertrand duopoly, assuming linear demands and constant marginal costs, welfare with the maximum-revenue tariff is always higher than free-trade welfare. Under perfect competition, assuming linear demand and supply, welfare with the maximum-revenue tariff will be higher than free-trade welfare if the country has sufficient market power.
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页码：442 / 447
页数：6
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