Performance Terms in CEO Compensation Contracts

被引：58
|
作者：
De Angelis, David [1 ]
Grinstein, Yaniv [2 ]
机构：
[1] Rice Univ, Houston, TX 77251 USA
[2] Cornell Univ, Ithaca, NY 14853 USA
来源：
REVIEW OF FINANCE | 2015年 / 19卷 / 02期
关键词：
STOCK OPTION AWARDS; EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION; LIFE-CYCLE; PRINCIPALS; INCENTIVES; IMPACT;
D O I：
10.1093/rof/rfu014
中图分类号：
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号：
0202 ;
摘要：
In December 2006, the Securities and Exchange Commission issued new rules that require enhanced disclosure on how firms tie CEO compensation to performance. We use this new available data to study the terms of performance-based awards in CEO compensation contracts in S&P 500 firms. We observe large variations in the choice of performance measures. Our evidence is consistent with predictions from optimal contracting theories: firms rely on performance measures that are more informative of CEO actions.
引用
收藏
页码：619 / 651
页数：33
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