Institutional investors and executive compensation

被引：1124

作者：

Hartzell, JC ^{[1
]}

Starks, LT ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Texas, McCombs Sch Business, Dept Finance, Austin, TX 78712 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF FINANCE | 2003年 / 58卷 / 06期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1046/j.1540-6261.2003.00608.x

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We find that institutional ownership concentration is positively related to the pay-for-performance sensitivity of executive compensation and negatively related to the level of compensation, even after controlling for firm size, industry, investment opportunities, and performance. These results suggest that the institutions serve a monitoring role in mitigating the agency problem between shareholders and managers. Additionally, we find that clientele effects exist among institutions for firms with certain compensation structures, suggesting that institutions also influence compensation structures through their preferences.

引用

页码：2351 / 2374

页数：24

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