Warranty Reserve: Contingent Liability, Information Signal, or Earnings Management Tool?

被引:43
|
作者
Cohen, Daniel [1 ]
Darrough, Masako N. [2 ]
Huang, Rong [2 ]
Zach, Tzachi [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Texas Dallas, Richardson, TX 75083 USA
[2] CUNY, Baruch Coll, New York, NY 10021 USA
[3] Ohio State Univ, Columbus, OH 43210 USA
来源
ACCOUNTING REVIEW | 2011年 / 86卷 / 02期
关键词
warranties; contingent liability; product quality; signaling; earnings management; CASUALTY INSURANCE INDUSTRY; DISCRETIONARY ACCRUALS; ACCOUNTING RESEARCH; PRODUCT QUALITY; MORAL HAZARD; VALUATION; PRICES; PERFORMANCE; THRESHOLDS; BENEFITS;
D O I
10.2308/accr.00000021
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We examine the information role of accounting disclosures on warranties, utilizing a database that became available due to the requirements of FIN 45. First, because firms use warranty policies as a business strategy to promote their products, a warranty reserve can serve two roles: an information signal regarding product quality, as well as a contingent liability. Consistent with this view, we find that the stock market recognizes that: (1) the warranty reserve contains information about firms' future performance, and (2) the reserve is a liability. Second, because warranty accruals require estimation of future claims, they can be used as a tool of earnings management. Our evidence indicates that managers use warranty accruals to manage earnings opportunistically to meet earnings targets. Finally, we find that the stock market recognizes the understatement of warranty liabilities of firms that managed earnings.
引用
收藏
页码:569 / 604
页数:36
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