Means-tested public support and the interaction between long-term care insurance and informal care

被引:9
|
作者
Bascans, Jean-Marc [1 ]
Courbage, Christophe [2 ]
Oros, Cornel [1 ,3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Poitiers, CRIEF, 2 Rue Jean Carbonnier, F-86022 Poitiers, France
[2] Univ Appl Sci Western Switzerland HES SO, Haute Ecole Gest Geneve, Rue Tambourine 17, CH-1227 Carouge, Switzerland
[3] Univ Orleans, LEO, Rue Blois, F-45067 Orleans, France
关键词
Long-term care; Informal care; Long-term care insurance; Means testing; FORMAL CARE; MARKET; FAMILY; PURCHASE; CHILDREN; FRANCE; EUROPE; NEEDS;
D O I
10.1007/s10754-016-9206-4
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This paper investigates theoretically how the structure of means-tested public long-term care (LTC) support influences the relationship between LTC insurance and informal care. Three types of public support encountered in various means-tested LTC schemes are examined. First, the level to be considered for means-testing only takes into account the level of wealth of the recipient without considering the cost of LTC or the possible insurance benefits. Second, the public support also considers the LTC needs of the recipient. Third, the means-test structure takes into consideration insurance benefits as well. Our results show that the optimal levels of insurance and informal care as well as their relationship are strongly influenced by the waysmeans-tested public support for LTC is structured, which have important implications in terms of public policy for the financing of LTC needs.
引用
收藏
页码:113 / 133
页数:21
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