Asymmetric competition in B2B spot markets

We model strategic behavior of two types of suppliers in B2B spot markets: a supplier that has forward contracts and uses the spot market only for inventory liquidation, and a supplier that uses the spot market as its sole selling channel. We find that when the spot market demand is small, the supplier that has forward contracts has a higher incentive to invest in expanding the spot market. When the spot market demand exceeds a threshold size, this situation is reversed, and the supplier with no contracts benefits more from making the spot market more prevalent. We show that a supplier with forward contracts benefits from the existence of the spot market more than a supplier with no contracts and that this result holds with both negative and positive correlation between spot market demand and contracted demand. We find that suppliers producing only for the spot market gain from working in industries where contracted demand and spot market demand are positively correlated, whereas suppliers that have forward contracts benefit from working in industries with a negative correlation between demands, since it allows them to better manage risk. In addition, both total industry supply and spot market supply are higher in industries where demands are negatively correlated.