Dissociative identity disorder and ambivalence

被引:1
|
作者
Maiese, Michelle [1 ]
机构
[1] Emmanuel Coll, Dept Philosophy, Boston, MA 02115 USA
关键词
dissociative identity disorder; multiple personality; dissociation; ambivalence; inner conflict; personal identity; MULTIPLE PERSONALITY-DISORDER;
D O I
10.1080/13869795.2016.1199728
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
While many theorists have argued that dissociative identity disorder (DID) is a case of multiple selves or persons in a single body, I maintain that DID instead should be understood as involving a single self who suffers from significant disruptions to self-consciousness. Evidence of overlapping abilities and memories, as well as the very logic of dissociation, supports the claim that DID results from internal conflict endured by a single self. Along these lines, I will maintain that alter-formation should be understood as the result of extreme emotional ambivalence. While it is true that subjects with DID exhibit volitional conflict, as Frankfurt [1988. The Importance of What We Care About. New York: Cambridge University Press; 1999. Necessity, Volition, and Love. New York: Cambridge University Press] maintains, I argue that these incompatible volitions have a deeper source: conflicting desires and affective stances concerning basic emotional needs that are not easily abandoned. A single subject turns to different alter-personalities as a way to cope with pervasive inner conflict while at the same time hiding contradictory impulses from herself.
引用
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页码:223 / 237
页数:15
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