Believing in Corporate Social Responsibility: An Indirect Evolutionary Analysis

被引:0
|
作者
Gueth, Werner [1 ,2 ]
Kirchkamp, Oliver [3 ]
机构
[1] Max Planck Inst Res Collect Goods, Kurt Schumacher Str 10, D-53113 Bonn, Germany
[2] LUISS Univ, Rome, Italy
[3] Friedrich Schiller Univ Jena, Empir & Expt Wirtschaftsforsch, Carl Zeiss Str 3, D-07737 Jena, Germany
关键词
corporate social responsibility; indirect evolution;
D O I
10.1628/jite-2021-0005
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
On a global market firms are randomly paired to engage in duopolistic competition based on conjectural payoffs, possibly different from true profits. Evolutionary fitness follows true profits. Competitors have beliefs about how competitor???s price and own corporate social responsibility (CSR) expenditures determine own demand. In the tradition of indirect evolution, specifically evolution of preferences, we first solve all possible duopoly markets, based on commonly known payoff conjectures. We then derive evolutionarily stable conjectures. Believing that CSR expenditures enhance demand is evolutionarily stable only when this is true. In contrast, evolutionarily stable beliefs concerning price interdependence usually differ from actual price interdependence.
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页码:167 / 177
页数:11
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