Reflective Judgment and Radical Evil in Kant's Religion

被引:1
|
作者
Stoner, Samuel A. [1 ]
Wilford, Paul T. [2 ]
机构
[1] Assumption Univ, Philosophy, Bangkok, Thailand
[2] Boston Coll, Polit Sci, Chestnut Hill, MA 02167 USA
来源
SOUTHERN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY | 2022年 / 60卷 / 02期
关键词
PROPENSITY; ARGUMENT;
D O I
10.1111/sjp.12443
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
This article argues that, on Kant's account, the claim that an individual is radically evil depends on a reflective judgment that treats all the choices this individual makes as if they were determined by a single supreme maxim. Subsequently, it shows that Kant's proof of the universality of radical evil is a transcendental argument, which establishes that the human experience of moral life as a constant struggle is only possible for a person whose choices are determined by a single supreme maxim if that person's supreme maxim is evil. It concludes that the concept of radical evil is a regulative principle, which explains how radical evil is consistent with human freedom.
引用
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页码:277 / 303
页数:27
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