This article focuses on Patocka's conception of "negative Platonism"; it proceeds from Patocka's study of the same name and looks to several other texts which have originated in connection with that study. First of all, it offers a brief resume of the key points of Patocka's conception (the experience of freedom, the conception of idea, the relation between idea and objecthood). Next, it summarises and comments on the main thoughts of Rezek's, Kouba's and Hejdanek's reflections and critiques of the conception (with a look at some other interpretations). With their help, the inner contradiction of Patocka's conception is demonstrated, in which idea should remain purely negative, and yet be a calling to the world, enabling true discourse about beings. In conclusion the author of the paper puts forward the suggestion that it was this contradictory nature that led Patocka to abandon his "negative Platonism".