Violation behavior in vertical restraint: Empirical analyses in the case of retail price maintenance

An extensive body of work within the marketing and economics literature has been devoted to studying vertical restraints, yet only a few researchers have investigated the violation behavior of retailers. In this paper, we investigate violation behavior in the context of retailer price maintenance. We investigate this behavior using a unique data set from a subsidy program in China, which includes transaction-level information that shows retail price maintenance (RPM) practices in multiple product categories by multiple manufacturers across multiple markets. The results from our fixed effects regression show that retailer violations are more likely to occur when intra-product competition is high. However, how retailer violation likelihood varies with inter-product competition may depend on the product category. We find that inter-product competition, is negatively associated with the likelihood of violation, for "less popular" product categories in the program such as washing machines, air conditioners, etc., but is positively associated with the likelihood of violation for "popular" product categories such as refrigerators, televisions, and cell phones. Our research provides some of the first empirical evidence about retailer violation behavior under RPM in the world's largest emerging market by focusing on the relationship between violation behavior and market structure. We discuss the implications for monitoring efforts of manufacturers and regulators. (C) 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.