The Sugar Daddy Game: How Wealthy Investors Change Competition in Professional Team Sports

被引：22
|
作者：
Lang, Markus [1 ]
Grossmann, Martin [1 ]
Theiler, Philipp [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Zurich, Dept Business Adm, CH-8032 Zurich, Switzerland
来源：
JOURNAL OF INSTITUTIONAL AND THEORETICAL ECONOMICS-ZEITSCHRIFT FUR DIE GESAMTE STAATSWISSENSCHAFT | 2011年 / 167卷 / 04期
关键词：
CONTEST SUCCESS FUNCTIONS; EUROPEAN FOOTBALL; SOCIAL-WELFARE; LEAGUES; ECONOMICS; BEHAVIOR; BASEBALL; BALANCE; MARKET; MODEL;
D O I：
10.1628/jite-2011-0002
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
Professional sports leagues have witnessed the appearance of sugar daddies people who invest enormous amounts of money in clubs and become their owners. This paper presents a contest model of a professional sports league that incorporates this phenomenon. We analyze how the appearance of a sugar daddy alters competitive balance and social welfare with respect to a league with purely profit-maximizing club owners. We further show that the welfare effect of revenue sharing in a sugar daddy league is ambiguous and depends on the degree of redistribution and on whether the sugar daddy invests in a small or a large club. (JEL: L83, L20, D43, C72)
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页码：557 / 577
页数：21
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