Independent director reputation incentives, accruals quality and audit fees

被引:39
|
作者
Bryan, David B. [1 ]
Mason, Terry W. [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ North Florida, Jacksonville, FL 32224 USA
[2] Kansas State Univ, Manhattan, KS 66506 USA
关键词
accruals quality; audit fees; auditor office size; independent director reputation incentives; EARNINGS MANAGEMENT; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; BOARD COMPOSITION; BUSINESS RISK; LITIGATION; DISCLOSURE; COMMITTEES; CONSERVATISM; COMPANIES; LAWSUITS;
D O I
10.1111/jbfa.12435
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
While prior research provides abundant evidence that independent directors are associated with favorable outcomes, researchers have only recently started to investigate the impact of independent director reputation incentives. This study examines whether the reputation incentives of independent directors are associated with accruals quality and audit fees. The results reveal a negative relationship between the proportion of independent directors with relatively low reputation incentives and accruals quality. Further, the proportion of independent directors with relatively low reputation incentives is positively associated with audit fees, suggesting that auditors view lower reputation incentives as increasing risk. We also find that Big 4/5 auditor office size moderates the relationship between independent director reputation incentives and audit fees. Specifically, our results indicate that audit fees increase less in response to lower reputation incentives as office size increases, suggesting that larger offices respond to the risks associated with lower reputation incentives more efficiently than smaller offices.
引用
收藏
页码:982 / 1011
页数:30
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