Strategic risk and coordination failure in blame games

被引：2
|
作者：
Ellingsen, Tore [2 ]
Ostling, Robert [1 ]
机构：
[1] Stockholm Univ, Inst Int Econ Studies, SE-10691 Stockholm, Sweden
[2] Stockholm Sch Econ, Dept Econ, SE-11883 Stockholm, Sweden
来源：
ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2011年 / 110卷 / 02期
关键词：
Coordination games; Weak-link games; Coordination failure; Strategic risk; EQUILIBRIUM; DILEMMA;
D O I：
10.1016/j.econlet.2010.10.018
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
Within a class of games that we call Blame Games, we discuss how strategic risk may discourage play of a unique and efficient (strictly) dominance solvable equilibrium. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码：90 / 92
页数：3
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