Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information

被引：6

作者：

Heller, Yuval ^{[1
]}

Solan, Eilon ^{[1
]}

Tomala, Tristan ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Tel Aviv Univ, Sch Math Sci, IL-69978 Tel Aviv, Israel

[2] HEC Paris, Econ & Decis Sci Dept, F-78351 Jouy En Josas, France

来源：

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 2012年 / 74卷 / 01期

基金：

以色列科学基金会;

关键词：

Cheap-talk; Communication equilibrium; Normal-form correlated equilibrium; Distributed computation; 2-PLAYER STOCHASTIC GAMES; INCOMPLETE INFORMATION; EQUILIBRIA;

D O I：

10.1016/j.geb.2011.05.002

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper studies extensive form games with public information where all players have the same information at each point in time. We prove that when there are at least three players, all communication equilibrium payoffs can be obtained by unmediated cheap-talk procedures. The result encompasses repeated games and stochastic games. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：222 / 234

页数：13

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