CEO optimism and forced turnover

被引：418

作者：

Campbell, T. Colin ^{[2
]}

Gallmeyer, Michael ^{[3
]}

Johnson, Shane A. ^{[1
]}

Rutherford, Jessica ^{[1
]}

Stanley, Brooke W. ^{[4
]}

机构：

[1] Texas A&M Univ, Mays Business Sch, College Stn, TX 77843 USA

[2] Miami Univ, Farmer Sch Business, Oxford, OH 45056 USA

[3] Univ Virginia, McIntire Sch Commerce, Charlottesville, VA USA

[4] Winthrop Univ, Coll Business Adm, Rock Hill, SC 29733 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS | 2011年 / 101卷 / 03期

关键词：

CEO turnover; Optimism; Overconfidence; Managerial biases; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; COMPARATIVE STATICS; FIRM PERFORMANCE; OVERCONFIDENCE; ACQUISITIONS; SUCCESSION; OWNERSHIP; DIRECTORS; IMPACT;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.03.004

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We show theoretically that optimism can lead a risk-averse Chief Executive Officer (CEO) to choose the first-best investment level that maximizes shareholder value. Optimism below (above) the interior optimum leads the CEO to underinvest (over-invest). Hence, if boards of directors act in the interests of shareholders, CEOs with relatively low or high optimism face a higher probability of forced turnover than moderately optimistic CEOs face. Using a large sample of turnovers, we find strong empirical support for this prediction. The results are consistent with the view that there is an interior optimum level of managerial optimism that maximizes firm value. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：695 / 712

页数：18

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