An old friend is better than two new ones? Approaches to market research in the context of digital transformation for the antitrust laws enforcement
被引:8
|
作者:
Shastitko, Andrey E.
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Lomonosov Moscow State Univ, Moscow, Russia
Russian Presidential Acad, Natl Econ & Publ Adm, Moscow, RussiaLomonosov Moscow State Univ, Moscow, Russia
Shastitko, Andrey E.
[1
,2
]
Markova, Olga A.
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Lomonosov Moscow State Univ, Moscow, Russia
Russian Presidential Acad, Natl Econ & Publ Adm, Moscow, Russia
Natl Res Univ, Higher Sch Econ, Moscow, RussiaLomonosov Moscow State Univ, Moscow, Russia
antitrust;
multisided markets;
platforms;
market definition;
indirect network externality;
SSNIP-test;
type I and type II errors;
2-SIDED MARKETS;
COMPETITION;
MERGERS;
D O I:
10.32609/0042-8736-2020-6-37-55
中图分类号:
F [经济];
学科分类号:
02 ;
摘要:
Digital transformation has led to changes in business models of traditional players in the existing markets. What is more, new entrants and new markets appeared, in particular platforms and multisided markets. The emergence and rapid development of platforms are caused primarily by the existence of so called indirect network externalities. Regarding to this, a question arises of whether the existing instruments of competition law enforcement and market analysis are still relevant when analyzing markets with digital platforms? This paper aims at discussing advantages and disadvantages of using various tools to define markets with platforms. In particular, we define the features of the SSNIP test when being applyed to markets with platforms. Furthermore, we analyze adjustment in tests for platform market definition in terms of possible type I and type II errors. All in all, it turns out that to reduce the likelihood of type I and type II errors while applying market definition technique to markets with platforms one should consider the type of platform analyzed: transaction platforms without pass-through and non-transaction matching platforms should be tackled as players in a multisided market, whereas non-transaction platforms should be analyzed as players in several interrelated markets. However, if the platform is allowed to adjust prices, there emerges additional challenge that the regulator and companies may manipulate the results of SSNIP test by applying different models of competition.