PURE NASH EQUILIBRIA IN CONCURRENT DETERMINISTIC GAMES

被引:24
|
作者
Bouyer, Patricia [1 ,2 ]
Brenguier, Romain [3 ]
Markey, Nicolas [1 ,2 ]
Ummels, Michael [4 ]
机构
[1] CNRS, LSV, F-75700 Paris, France
[2] ENS Cachan, Cachan, France
[3] Univ Libre Bruxelles, Brussels, Belgium
[4] German Aerosp Ctr, Inst Transportat Syst, Cologne, Germany
基金
欧洲研究理事会;
关键词
Nash equilibria; concurrent games; qualitative objectives; ordered objectives;
D O I
10.2168/LMCS-11(2:9)2015
中图分类号
TP301 [理论、方法];
学科分类号
081202 ;
摘要
We study pure-strategy Nash equilibria in multi-player concurrent deterministic games, for a variety of preference relations. We provide a novel construction, called the suspect game, which transforms a multi-player concurrent game into a two-player turn-based game which turns Nash equilibria into winning strategies (for some objective that depends on the preference relations of the players in the original game). We use that transformation to design algorithms for computing Nash equilibria in finite games, which in most cases have optimal worst-case complexity, for large classes of preference relations. This includes the purely qualitative framework, where each player has a single omega-regular objective that she wants to satisfy, but also the larger class of semi-quantitative objectives, where each player has several omega-regular objectives equipped with a preorder (for instance, a player may want to satisfy all her objectives, or to maximise the number of objectives that she achieves.)
引用
收藏
页数:72
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