Address Space Randomization for Mobile Devices

被引:0
|
作者
Bojinov, Hristo [1 ]
Boneh, Dan [1 ]
Cannings, Rich
Malchev, Iliyan
机构
[1] Stanford Univ, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
关键词
ASLR; control flow hijacking; return-to-libc; mobile devices; smartphones; Android;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
TP18 [人工智能理论];
学科分类号
081104 ; 0812 ; 0835 ; 1405 ;
摘要
Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) is a defensive technique supported by many desktop and server operating systems. While smartphone vendors wish to make it available on their platforms, there are technical challenges in implementing ASLR on these devices. Pre-linking, limited processing power and restrictive update processes make it difficult to use existing ASLR implementation strategies even on the latest generation of smartphones. In this paper we introduce retouching, a mechanism for executable ASLR that requires no kernel modifications and is suitable for mobile devices. We have implemented ASLR for the Android operating system and evaluated its effectiveness and performance. In addition, we introduce crash stack analysis, a technique that uses crash reports locally on the device, or in aggregate in the cloud to reliably detect attempts to brute-force ASLR protection. We expect that retouching and crash stack analysis will become standard techniques in mobile ASLR implementations.
引用
收藏
页码:127 / 137
页数:11
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