Spectrum auction designs and revenue variations

被引：3
|
作者：
Madden, Gary [1 ]
Saglam, Ismail [2 ]
Hussain, Inayat [1 ]
机构：
[1] Curtin Univ, Dept Econ & Property, Perth, WA 6845, Australia
[2] Ipek Univ, Dept Econ, Ankara, Turkey
来源：
APPLIED ECONOMICS | 2015年 / 47卷 / 17期
关键词：
mobile wireless telephone markets; spectrum auctions; auction revenue; FIELD EXPERIMENTS; RESERVE PRICES; COMMON VALUES; ORAL AUCTION; BEHAVIOR; PRIVATE; 1ST-PRICE; 2ND-PRICE; EQUIVALENCE; INFORMATION;
D O I：
10.1080/00036846.2014.1000532
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This study examines a sample of 93 national 3G spectrum auctions for the period 2000-2011 to identify the sources of substantial revenue variations. An implied reduced-form econometric model that recognises the censored nature of the sample relates per capita winning bid (per Mhz, per million populations) values to regulator-determined auction design characteristics, auction competitiveness, mobile wireless market conditions and spectrum package attributes identified from tender documents. The analysis reveals that among other factors, all auction design characteristics independently impact on realized 3G spectrum auction revenues.
引用
收藏
页码：1748 / 1763
页数：16
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [1] Dynamic Auction for Revenue Maximization in Spectrum Market
    Ayoub Alsarhan
    Ahmad Quttoum
    Mohammad Bsoul
    Wireless Personal Communications, 2015, 83 : 1405 - 1423
  • [2] Dynamic Auction for Revenue Maximization in Spectrum Market
    Alsarhan, Ayoub
    Quttoum, Ahmad
    Bsoul, Mohammad
    WIRELESS PERSONAL COMMUNICATIONS, 2015, 83 (02) : 1405 - 1423
  • [3] Revenue Generation for Truthful Spectrum Auction in Dynamic Spectrum Access
    Jia, Juncheng
    Zhang, Qian
    Zhang, Qin
    Liu, Mingyan
    MOBIHOC'09 PROCEEDINGS OF THE TENTH ACM INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON MOBILE AD HOC NETWORKING AND COMPUTING, 2009, : 3 - 12
  • [4] Differentially Private Spectrum Auction With Approximate Revenue Maximization
    Zhu, Ruihao
    Li, Zhijing
    Wu, Fan
    Shin, Kang G.
    Chen, Guihai
    MOBIHOC'14: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 15TH ACM INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON MOBILE AD HOC NETWORKING AND COMPUTING, 2014, : 185 - 194
  • [5] A Prior-Free Spectrum Auction for Approximate Revenue Maximization
    Ying, Chen
    Huang, Hao
    Gopinathan, Ajay
    Li, Zongpeng
    COMPUTER JOURNAL, 2017, 60 (06): : 898 - 910
  • [6] A Strategy-proof Spectrum Auction for Balancing Revenue and Fairness
    Wu, Chunchun
    Zhong, Sheng
    Chen, Guihai
    2014 IEEE 11TH CONSUMER COMMUNICATIONS AND NETWORKING CONFERENCE (CCNC), 2014,
  • [7] Hierarchical modeling and prediction of spectrum auction revenue by a posteriori clusters
    Yun, Sean
    Sarkani, Shahram
    Mazzuchi, Thomas A.
    INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING MANAGEMENT, 2014, 9 (02) : 125 - 132
  • [8] A Prior-Free Revenue Maximizing Auction For Secondary Spectrum Access
    Gopinathan, Ajay
    Li, Zongpeng
    2011 PROCEEDINGS IEEE INFOCOM, 2011, : 86 - 90
  • [9] A comparison of spectrum auction designs in the US and in Germany - the ERMES example
    Ruhle, EO
    Sturmer, S
    GLOBAL NETWORKING '97 - 21ST CENTURY COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS, VOL 2: POLICY; SOCIAL APPLICATIONS, 1997, : 47 - 57
  • [10] Differentially Private and Strategy-Proof Spectrum Auction with Approximate Revenue Maximization
    Zhu, Ruihao
    Shin, Kang G.
    2015 IEEE CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER COMMUNICATIONS (INFOCOM), 2015,
12345