Problems for Mainstream Evidentialism

被引:0
|
作者
Piazza, Tommaso [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Pavia, Dipartimento Studi Umanistici, Pavia, Italy
关键词
Evidentialism; ontology of evidence; explanationism; inferential justification; perceptual justification; doxastic justification; EXPLANATIONISM; KNOWLEDGE; BELIEFS; REASONS; FUTURE;
D O I
10.1080/00455091.2016.1244629
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
Evidentialism says that a subject S's justification is entirely determined by S's evidence. The plausibility of evidentialism depends on (1) what kind of entities constitute a subject S's evidence and (2) what one takes the support relation to consist in. Conee and Feldman's mainstream evidentialism (ME) incorporates a psychologist answer to (1) and an explanationist answer to (2). ME naturally accommodates perceptual justification. However, it does not accommodate intuitive cases of inferential justification. In the second part of the paper, I consider and reject a reply based on a refined explanationist theory of the support relation proposed by K McCain.
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页码:148 / 165
页数:18
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