An Improved Coercion-Resistant E-Voting Scheme

E-voting has gradually replaced the traditional voting methods to make it easier for people to conduct an election. Recently, Liu et al. propose an unconditional secure e-voting scheme using secret sharing and k-anonymity. Their scheme achieves correct tallying results without revealing raw voting information. However, in this paper, we observe that Liu et al.'s scheme cannot achieve coercion resistance in e-voting since the voter can prove the content of his ballot to the colluded candidates. Then, we propose an improved e-voting scheme to cover up the ballot of the voter with masked values. In this way, even if the voter colludes with corresponding candidates, he cannot prove which candidate he has voted for. Moreover, comparing with Liu et al.'s scheme, the security analysis shows that our proposed e-voting scheme achieves these security requirements like the coercion resistance, integrity of ballots, privacy of ballots, multiple-voting detection, and fairness. Through performance analysis, the experimental results show that our proposed e-voting scheme has higher time efficiency. Compared with other schemes, our scheme achieves a complete voting process and obtains the correct tallying result without complex computation and intricate communication process.