TRAFFIC RATIONING AND SHORT-TERM AND LONG-TERM EQUILIBRIUM

Road rationing, as a possible alternative or supplement to road pricing, has been implemented in a number of large cities but received only very limited attention in the community of theoretical transportation research. This paper analyzes the effects of road rationing under both short-term and long-term traffic equilibrium. The 'short-term' equilibrium describes the situation under which no one changes car ownership but simply obeys the rationing rules. In contrast, the long-term equilibrium under road rationing takes into account the public's self-adjustment activities like car consumptions and car disposals and characterizes the equilibrium situation where no one has incentive to change car ownership any more. For both short- and long-term rationing, equilibrium patterns are figured out, and the average daily trip travel time with one car is found to be the essential factor in determining the attainability of Pareto improvement. Under the same rationing degree, it is found that Pareto improvement is easier to obtain by short-term rationing than by long-term rationing. If Pareto improvement fails, the subgroups who benefit and suffer from rationing are discerned respectively.