Are uniform solutions focal? The case of international environmental agreements

被引:4
|
作者
Brandt, US [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ So Denmark, Dept Environm & Business Econ, DK-6700 Esbjerg, Denmark
来源
ENVIRONMENTAL & RESOURCE ECONOMICS | 2003年 / 25卷 / 03期
关键词
feasibility constraints; focal solutions; international environmental agreements; uniform solutions;
D O I
10.1023/A:1024432709657
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The application of uniform solutions has several drawbacks, notably their lack of cost efficiency and their inability to guarantee individual rationality. A 'proper' specification of uniform solutions, however, reveals that uniform solutions that satisfy individual rationality always exist. When all countries hold private information about their own reduction costs, there only exists one solution that always satisfies individually rationality without use of side payments and the requirement of dominant strategy implementation: The solution that selects the smallest individually preferred uniform reduction which also give a theoretical explanation of the 'lowest common denominator effect'.
引用
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页码:357 / 376
页数:20
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