The present state of the scientific realism debate

被引：39
|
作者：
Psillos, S [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Athens, Dept Hist & Philosophy Sci, Athens 16121, Greece
来源：
BRITISH JOURNAL FOR THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE | 2000年 / 51卷
关键词：
D O I：
10.1093/bjps/51.4.705
中图分类号：
N09 [自然科学史]; B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号：
01 ; 0101 ; 010108 ; 060207 ; 060305 ; 0712 ;
摘要：
In this survey article I try to appraise the present state of the scientific realism debate with an eye to important but hitherto unexplored suggestions and open issues that need further work. In Section 2, I mostly focus on the relationship between scientific realism and truth. In Section 3, I discuss the grounds for realists' epistemic optimism. 1 Introduction 2 What is scientific realism? 2.1 Modesty and presumptuousness 2.2 Compromising presumptuousness 2.3 Compromising modesty 2.4 Conceptual independence and epistemic luck 3 Epistemic optimism 4 Conclusion.
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页码：705 / 728
页数：24
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