Do Moral Questions Ask for Answers?

被引:1
|
作者
De Mesel, Benjamin [1 ]
机构
[1] Katholieke Univ Leuven, Ctr Eth Social & Polit Philosophy, Inst Philosophy, Res Fdn Flanders FWO, Leuven, Belgium
关键词
Raimond Gaita; Ludwig Wittgenstein; Moral modesty; Moral question; Moral advice; Narrow answer; ETHICS;
D O I
10.1007/s11406-014-9565-3
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
It is often assumed that moral questions ask for answers in the way other questions do. In this article, moral and non-moral versions of the question 'Should I do x or y?' are compared. While non-moral questions of that form typically ask for answers of the form 'You should do x/y', so-called 'narrow answers', moral questions often do not ask for such narrow answers. Rather, they ask for answers recognizing their delicacy, the need for a deeper understanding of the meaning of the alternatives and the fact that moral decisions are, as Gaita formulates it, 'non-accidentally and inescapably' the agent's to make. In short, moral questions often ask for a kind of answer that is highly different from the kind of answer non-moral questions ask for. In presupposing the ideal answer to a moral question to be a narrow answer, moral philosophers have tended to overlook this.
引用
收藏
页码:43 / 61
页数:19
相关论文
共 50 条