Strategic Incentives in Biosecurity Actions: Theoretical and Empirical Analyses

被引:0
|
作者
Kobayashi, Mimako [1 ]
Melkonyan, Tigran [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Nevada, Dept Econ, Reno, NV 89557 USA
[2] Univ Exeter, Dept Econ, Exeter EX4 4QJ, Devon, England
关键词
California; livestock disease; livestock exhibition; strategic complements; strategic substitutes; LIVESTOCK DISEASE MANAGEMENT; ANIMAL-DISEASE; EQUILIBRIUM; GAMES; COMPLEMENTARITIES; MODELS; POLICY;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
F3 [农业经济];
学科分类号
0202 ; 020205 ; 1203 ;
摘要
We model a game between two players taking biosecurity actions and characterize the Nash equilibria and their properties for the cases of strategic complements and substitutes. Implications of the theoretical model are investigated using data for biosecurity behavior among producers participating in a livestock exhibition. Biosecurity actions with own benefits and lasting impacts in home communities exhibit a positive relationship with behavior of the producers from geographically close areas. The number and probabilities of biosecurity actions taken by exhibitors are positively associated with the number of animals exhibited and they vary among commercial and hobby producers and across species/types of commercial production.
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页码:242 / 262
页数:21
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