Implementing egalitarian-equivalent allocation of indivisible goods on restricted domains

被引:16
|
作者
Ohseto, S [1 ]
机构
[1] Tokyo Metropolitan Univ, Fac Econ, Tokyo 1920397, Japan
关键词
indivisible goods; egalitarian-equivalence; strategy-proofness; Nash implementation;
D O I
10.1007/s00199-003-0369-0
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We study the problem of allocating several units of homogeneous indivisible goods when monetary compensations are possible. First, we show that there is no strategy-proof, budget balanced, and egalitarian-equivalent mechanism even on extremely restricted preference domains. Next, we present two characterizations of strategy-proof and decision-efficient mechanisms that satisfy a stronger version of egalitarian-equivalence on preference domains bounded above. These characterizations tell us a trade-off between strategy-proofness and Pareto efficiency, and a relationship with strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms. Finally, we prove that no egalitarian-equivalent mechanism is Nash implementable even on extremely restricted preference domains.
引用
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页码:659 / 670
页数:12
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