INVESTMENT INCENTIVES IN OPEN-SOURCE AND PROPRIETARY TWO-SIDED PLATFORMS

被引:27
|
作者
Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon [1 ]
Llanes, Gaston [2 ]
机构
[1] Harvard Univ, Sch Business, Strategy Unit, Boston, MA 02163 USA
[2] Pontificia Univ Catolica Chile, Santiago, Chile
关键词
COMPETITION; TECHNOLOGY; ECONOMICS; LINUX;
D O I
10.1111/jems.12089
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We study incentives to invest in platform quality in open-source and proprietary two-sided platforms. Open platforms have open access, and developers invest to improve the platform. Proprietary platforms have closed access, and investment is done by the platform owner. We present five main results. First, open platforms may benefit from limited developer access. Second, an open platform may lead to higher investment than a proprietary platform. Third, opening one side of a proprietary platform may lower incentives to invest in platform quality. Fourth, the structure of access prices of the proprietary platform depends on (i) how changes in the number of developers affect the incentives to invest in the open platform, and (ii) how investment in the open platform affects the revenues of the proprietary platform. Finally, a proprietary platform may benefit from higher investment in the open platform. This result helps to explain why the owner of a proprietary platform such as Microsoft has chosen to contribute to the development of Linux.
引用
收藏
页码:306 / 324
页数:19
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [1] Two-sided competition of proprietary vs. open source technology platforms and the implications for the software industry
    Economides, Nicholas
    Katsamakas, Evangelos
    MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, 2006, 52 (07) : 1057 - 1071
  • [2] Optimizing Investment in Two-Sided Platforms
    Yang, Tian-Tian
    Xuan, Xiao
    Huang, Wen-Ya
    Duan, Wen-Qi
    EURASIA JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY EDUCATION, 2017, 13 (12) : 7629 - 7636
  • [3] Could coexistence of open-source and proprietary platforms be an equilibrium outcome?
    Chou, Chung-Hui
    MANCHESTER SCHOOL, 2021, 89 (03): : 297 - 309
  • [4] FairRec: Two-Sided Fairness for Personalized Recommendations in Two-Sided Platforms
    Patro, Gourab K.
    Biswas, Arpita
    Ganguly, Niloy
    Gummadi, Krishna P.
    Chakraborty, Abhijnan
    WEB CONFERENCE 2020: PROCEEDINGS OF THE WORLD WIDE WEB CONFERENCE (WWW 2020), 2020, : 1194 - 1204
  • [5] Private contracts in two-sided platforms
    Llanes, Gaston
    Ruiz-Aliseda, Francisco
    RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 2021, 52 (04): : 815 - 838
  • [6] Jailbreaking in closed two-sided platforms
    Liu, Yunhao
    Feng, Gengzhong
    Sun, Yangyang
    Kong, Xiangyin
    INFORMATION & MANAGEMENT, 2023, 60 (08)
  • [7] Pricing and commitment by two-sided platforms
    Hagiu, Andrei
    RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 2006, 37 (03): : 720 - 737
  • [8] Price disclosure by two-sided platforms
    Belleflamme, Paul
    Peitz, Martin
    INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, 2019, 67
  • [9] Seller competition on two-sided platforms
    Chawla, Neaketa
    Mondal, Debasis
    JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 2024, 142 (03) : 213 - 245
  • [10] Collusion between two-sided platforms
    Lefouili, Yassine
    Pinho, Joana
    INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, 2020, 72 (72)