THE DYNAMICS OF FITNESS AND WEALTH DISTRIBUTIONS - A STOCHASTIC GAME-THEORETIC MODEL

被引:1
|
作者
Gibaud, Sylvain [1 ]
Weibull, Jorgen [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Paul Sabatier, Inst Math Toulouse, Toulouse, France
[2] Stockholm Sch Econ, Dept Econ, Stockholm, Sweden
关键词
Hawk-Dove; fitness dynamics; wealth dynamics; fitness distribution; wealth distribution; curse of the riches; ergodicity; propagation of chaos; FIGHTING BEHAVIOR; EVOLUTION;
D O I
10.3934/jdg.2022016
中图分类号
O1 [数学];
学科分类号
0701 ; 070101 ;
摘要
A model of the dynamics of distributions of individual wealth, or of individual Darwinian fitness, is here developed. Pairs of individuals are recurrently and randomly matched to play a game over a resource. In addition, all individuals have random access to a constant background source, and their fitness or wealth depreciates over time. For brevity, we focus on the wellknown Hawk-Dove game. In the base-line model, the probability of winning a fight over a resource is the same for both parties. In an extended version, the individual with higher current fitness or wealth has a higher probability of winning. Analytical results are given for the fitness/wealth distribution at any given time, for the evolution of average fitness/wealth over time, and for the asymptotics with respect to both time and population size. Long-run average fitness/wealth is non-monotonic in the value of the resource, thus providing a potential explanation of the so-called curse of the riches.
引用
收藏
页码:405 / 432
页数:28
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