Free riding in voluntary environmental programs: The case of the US EPA WasteWise program

被引:77
|
作者
Delmas, M [1 ]
Keller, A [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Calif Santa Barbara, Donald Bren Sch Environm Sci & Management, Santa Barbara, CA 93101 USA
关键词
Environmental Protection; Environmental Protection Agency; Economic Policy; Protection Agency; Solid Waste;
D O I
10.1007/s11077-005-6592-8
中图分类号
C93 [管理学]; D035 [国家行政管理]; D523 [行政管理]; D63 [国家行政管理];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ; 1204 ; 120401 ;
摘要
Voluntary Environmental Programs (VPs) involving industry and regulatory agencies have emerged as the promise of the future in environmental policy circles. Although the number of these agreements is increasing in OECD countries, there are still concerns about their effectiveness; in particular that "free-riding" behavior may be difficult to avoid within VPs. Free riding occurs when one firm benefits from the actions of another without sharing the costs. Free-riding behavior may undermine the credibility of VPs and therefore their viability. Our paper focuses on understanding the factors that favor or hamper free-riding behavior in VPs. Our analysis is based on the case of the WasteWise program that was established by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency to reduce municipal solid waste.
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页码:91 / 106
页数:16
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