The Dynamics of Investment, Payout and Debt

被引：40
|
作者：
Lambrecht, Bart M. [1 ,2 ]
Myers, Stewart C. [3 ,4 ]
机构：
[1] Cambridge Judge Business Sch, Cambridge, England
[2] CEPR, Washington, DC 20009 USA
[3] MIT, Sloan Sch Management, Cambridge, MA 02139 USA
[4] NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
来源：
REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES | 2017年 / 30卷 / 11期
关键词：
CAPITAL STRUCTURE DYNAMICS; TRANSACTION COSTS; PORTFOLIO SELECTION; MANAGERIAL RENTS; CONSUMPTION; MODEL; RISK; GOVERNANCE; DECISIONS; DIVIDENDS;
D O I：
10.1093/rfs/hhx081
中图分类号：
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号：
0202 ;
摘要：
We develop a dynamic agency model of a public corporation. Managers underinvest because of risk aversion. They smooth rents and payout. They do not exploit interest tax shields fully. The interactions of investment, debt, and payout decisions can change drastically depending on managers' preferences. Managers with power utility set investment, debt, and payout proportional to the firm's net worth, generating a constant (possibly negative) net debt ratio. With exponential utility, investment decisions are separated from decisions about debt and payout. More profitable firms become cash cows, and less profitable firms accumulate debt, as in a pecking-order model.
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页码：3759 / 3800
页数：42
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