This paper is divided into two parts. Part I discusses the Confucian idea of moral knowledge in the context of Ryle's classical distinction between knowing-that and knowing-how, showing that while Confucian moral knowledge does includes both knowing-that and knowing-how (which also indicates that these two are not separate), it also has something not included in either of the two types of knowledge: inclination to act accordingly. This introduces the issue to be discussed in Part II of this paper. Contemporary Humeans would regard Confucianism as confused in regarding inclination to act, which is basically an element of desire, as part of knowledge, which appears as belief, since desire and belief are two entirely different mental states with the opposite directions of fit with the world. Part II shows that there can be a single mental state, that of "besire," that includes both belief and desire and Confucian moral knowledge is precisely one example of such a besire. In this Confucian besire, since the belief is a normative belief, which is different from the descriptive belief, its direction of fit with the world is consistent with the direction of fit between the desire and the world: from the mind to the world. So besire is not bizarre as claimed by contemporary Humeans.
