Partial fiscal decentralization and sub-national government fiscal discipline: empirical evidence from OECD countries

被引:29
|
作者
Asatryan, Zareh [1 ,2 ]
Feld, Lars P. [2 ]
Geys, Benny [3 ,4 ]
机构
[1] ZEW Mannheim, D-79100 Freiburg, Germany
[2] Univ Freiburg, D-79100 Freiburg, Germany
[3] Norwegian Business Sch BI, Brussels, Belgium
[4] Vrije Univ Brussel, Brussels, Belgium
关键词
Fiscal federalism; Revenue autonomy; Budget deficits; BUDGET DEFICITS; PUBLIC DEBT; FEDERALISM;
D O I
10.1007/s11127-015-0250-2
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Recent theoretical research suggests that financing sub-national governments' expenditure out of own revenue sources is linked to more responsible budgeting, because the financial implications of spending decisions then are internalized within a jurisdiction. We test this proposition empirically on a sample of 23 OECD countries over the 1975-2000 period, and find evidence in line with the hypothesis that greater revenue decentralization (measured as sub-national governments' share of own source tax revenues in general government tax revenue) is associated with improved sub-national government budget deficits/surpluses. This finding is cross-validated with a novel, independent dataset consisting of all 34 OECD member states from 2002 to 2008.
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页码:307 / 320
页数:14
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