Moral character evaluation: Testing another's moral-cognitive machinery

People evaluate the moral character of others not only based on what they do, but also on what leads them to do it. Because an agents state of mind is not directly observable, people typically engage in mindreading-attempts at inferring mental states-when forming moral evaluations. The present paper identifies a general target of such mental state inference, mental occurrents-a catchall term for the thoughts, beliefs, principles, feelings, concerns, and rules accessible in an agents mind when confronting a morally relevant decision. Moral mental occurrents are those that can provide a moral justification for a particular course of action. Whereas previous mindreading research has examined how people reason back to make sense of an agents behavior, we instead ask how inferred moral mental occurrents (MOs) constrain moral evaluations for an agents subsequent actions. Our studies distinguish three accounts of how inferred MOs influence moral evaluations, show that people rely on inferred MOs spontaneously (instead of merely when experimental measures draw attention to them), and identify nonmoral contextual cues (e.g., whether the situation demands a quick decision) that guide inferences about MOs. Implications for theory of mind, moral psychology, and social cognition are discussed.