SgxPectre: Stealing Intel Secrets From SGX Enclaves via Speculative Execution

被引：14

作者：

Chen, Guoxing ^{[1
]}

Chen, Sanchuan ^{[2
]}

Xiao, Yuan ^{[2
]}

Zhang, Yinqian ^{[2
]}

Lin, Zhiqiang ^{[3
]}

Lai, Ten-Hwang ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Ohio State Univ, Columbus, OH 43210 USA

[2] Ohio State Univ, Dept Comp Sci & Engn, Columbus, OH 43210 USA

[3] Ohio State Univ, Comp Sci & Engn, Columbus, OH 43210 USA

来源：

IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY | 2020年 / 18卷 / 03期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

Computer security; Program processors; Hardware; Registers; Microarchitecture;

D O I：

10.1109/MSEC.2019.2963021

中图分类号：

TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];

学科分类号：

0812 ;

摘要：

The speculative execution of side-channel vulnerabilities in microarchitecture processors has raised concerns about the security of Intel's Software Guard eXtensions (SGX). We present SgxPectre attacks, the SGX variants of Spectre attacks, which exploit speculative execution vulnerabilities to subvert the confidentiality of SGX enclaves; evaluate Intel's existing countermeasures against SgxPectre attacks; and discuss security implications.

引用

页码：28 / 37

页数：10