Why did Turkish democracy collapse? A political economy account of AKP's authoritarianism

被引:56
|
作者
Esen, Berk [1 ]
Gumuscu, Sebnem [2 ]
机构
[1] Bilkent Univ, Int Relat, Ankara, Turkey
[2] Middlebury Coll, Polit Sci, Middlebury, VT 05753 USA
关键词
AKP; clientelism; democratic breakdown; Recep Tayyip Erdogan; Turkey; INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE; REGIME; PARTY; TURKEY; ISLAM; DEMOCRATIZATION; NEOLIBERALISM; MODERNIZATION; CLIENTELISM; PERFORMANCE;
D O I
10.1177/1354068820923722
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
After decades of multiparty politics, Turkey is no longer a democracy. A theory-upending case, the country has descended into a competitive authoritarian regime under the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi-AKP), despite rising income and education levels and strong links with the West. What accounts for democratic breakdown in such an unlikely case? Instead of ideological and institutional factors, we offer a political economy account. We contend that the coalitional ties that the AKP forged with businesses and the urban poor through the distribution of public resources has altered the cost of toleration for the party leadership and their dependent clients, while reducing the cost of suppression for incumbents. This new political calculus led to increasing authoritarianism of the AKP government through securitization of dissent, mounting repression, and systematic violation of civil liberties.
引用
收藏
页码:1075 / 1091
页数:17
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