On the Coherence of Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Psychology

In the paper, I suggest that there is an incoherence between, on the one hand, Wittgenstein's view that understanding a linguistic expression and the intentional action of using a linguistic expression are possible causes or effects of other psychological or physical "entities", and, on the other hand, Wittgenstein's account of the concepts of understanding and intending. Also, I suggest that there is an incoherence between, on the one hand, Wittgenstein's view that all sorts of psychological entities are possible causes or effects of other psychological or physical entities, and, on the other hand, Wittgenstein's criterial account of psychological concepts. Finally, I propose an alternative to Wittgenstein's view, espoused early in the Philosophical Investigations, that a call with a purpose is identical with a mere sequence of sounds, and I suggest that if a purely psychological entity depends for its "existence" on another psychological or physical entity, or vice versa, the dependence is that of logical implication.