The two anguishes of 'Etre et Temps' and 'Unbedeutsamkeit'

Can phenomenology do without a phenomenality of feeling? Yes, provided that the latter is only an "accident of subjectivity" or a simple effect connected with the apprehension of the being. But no, from the perspective of the bringing to light of "feelings" not induced by the being, but properly determining for it. The "fundamental tonality" (Grundstimmung), analysed by Heidegger, particularly in Being and Time, is of this latter type. It obliges phenomenology to take into account an extraordinary "lived moment", for which there is no phenomenon in good and proper form. This "lesson" in phenomenology is given by Heidegger himself, especially in his classical distinction between anguish and fear. But it is uncertain if this distinction is not already required within anguish itself.