Aid for Vote? United Nations General Assembly Voting and American Aid Allocation

被引:23
|
作者
Woo, Byungwon [1 ]
Chung, Eunbin [2 ]
机构
[1] Hankuk Univ Foreign Studies, Div Language & Diplomacy, Int Polit Econ, Seoul, South Korea
[2] Univ Utah, Polit Sci, Salt Lake City, UT USA
关键词
United Nations; Foreign aid; international organization; general assembly; vote buying; US FOREIGN-AID; POLITICS; GOVERNMENTS; STATES;
D O I
10.1177/0032321717739144
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
How do political factors affect foreign aid allocation? Recognizing that aid can be used as inducement, we argue that the US has incentives to provide aid to countries who oppose it a priori at the United Nations General Assembly when it is the sole country that "buys votes with aid, in order to maximize the number of favorable votes. When there is a rival country trying to buy votes, as was the case during the Cold War, there are incentives for the US to provide aid even to those who support its position already. We empirically demonstrate that the US provides more aid to countries who hold unfavorable positions to the US only in the post-Cold War era.
引用
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页码:1002 / 1026
页数:25
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