Voting in collective best-choice problem with complete information
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作者:
Ivashko, A. A.
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机构:
Russian Acad Sci, Inst Appl Math Res, Karelian Res Ctr, Petrozavodsk, RussiaRussian Acad Sci, Inst Appl Math Res, Karelian Res Ctr, Petrozavodsk, Russia
Ivashko, A. A.
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机构:
[1] Russian Acad Sci, Inst Appl Math Res, Karelian Res Ctr, Petrozavodsk, Russia
This paper considers a noncooperative m-player best-choice game with complete information about the quality parameters of incoming candidates. Collective decision-making is based on voting. The optimal threshold strategies and payoffs of the players are found depending on the voting threshold. The results of numerical simulation are presented.