Ruling elites' rotation and asset ownership: implications for property rights

被引:6
|
作者
Polishchuk, Leonid [1 ]
Syunyaev, Georgiy [1 ]
机构
[1] NRU Higher Sch Econ, Moscow 101000, Russia
关键词
Endogenous property rights; Credible commitment; Stationary bandit; ECONOMIC-GROWTH; INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY; RESOURCE CURSE; PANEL-DATA; DEMOCRACY; INEQUALITY; GOVERNMENT; POLITICS; DICTATORSHIP; INSTABILITY;
D O I
10.1007/s11127-014-0210-2
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We provide a theory and empirical evidence indicating that the rotation of ruling elites in conjunction with elites' asset ownership could improve property rights protection in non-democracies. The mechanism that upholds property rights is based on elites' concern about the security of their own asset ownership in the event they lose power. Such incentives provide a solution to the credible commitment problem in maintaining secure property rights when institutional restrictions on expropriation are weak or absent.
引用
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页码:159 / 182
页数:24
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