The Switching Generator: New Clock-Controlled Generator with Resistance against the Algebraic and Side Channel Attacks

Since Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in stream modes, such as counter (CTR), output feedback (OFB) and cipher feedback (CFB), can meet most industrial requirements, the range of applications for dedicated stream ciphers is decreasing. There are many attack results using algebraic properties and side channel information against stream ciphers for hardware applications. Al-Hinai et al. presented an algebraic attack approach to a family of irregularly clock-controlled linear feedback shift register systems: the stop and go generator, self-decimated generator and alternating step generator. Other clock-controlled systems, such as shrinking and cascade generators, are indeed vulnerable against side channel attacks. To overcome these threats, new clock-controlled systems were presented, e.g., the generalized alternating step generator, cascade jump-controlled generator and mutual clock-controlled generator. However, the algebraic attack could be applied directly on these new systems. In this paper, we propose a new clock-controlled generator: the switching generator, which has resistance to algebraic and side channel attacks. This generator also preserves both security properties and the efficiency of existing clock-controlled generators.