The value of private information in monopoly

被引:7
|
作者
Saak, Alexander E. [1 ]
机构
[1] Kansas State Univ, Dept Agr Econ, Manhattan, KS 66506 USA
来源
JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS | 2008年 / 56卷 / 01期
关键词
D O I
10.1111/j.1467-6451.2008.00337.x
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We investigate a basic question about a monopoly with incomplete information: when does the seller have an incentive to allow potential buyers to acquire more private information about their tastes for the seller's product? Under plausible conditions such as log-concave density of willingness-to-pay and convex marginal cost, the seller prefers that the paying customers be well informed as a group but be left in the dark regarding their individual tastes.
引用
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页码:169 / 189
页数:21
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