The Agency Cost Alienation of State-owned Enterprise and its Influence Mechanism in Classification Governance

Under the background of state-owned enterprise classification governance, this paper starts from the different types of corruption in state-owned enterprise (SOE), based on the data of listed SOEs from 2008 to 2014, constructs five agency costs alienation, classifies and measures the their influence mechanism on the enterprise performance, and then establishes effective strategy for SOE classification governance. In this study, we have found that executives generally exist the serious problems of rent-seeking, on-the-job consumption and related transactions to seek private benefits, which bring significant negative effect to the enterprise performance; the burden of social responsibility will damage the short interests of internal stakeholders, while increase the media exposure degree can improve enterprise performance through external supervision and constriction. Furthermore, both CEO duality in SOEs and the close political association will enlarge effect of agency cost on enterprise performance, but its influence mechanism are different in the measurement of classified SOEs, so it is imperative for government to implement the classified management in SOEs. Opening mixed ownership reform, realizing the diversification of capital, improving the competition mechanism on professional manager market, perfecting laws and related policies on SOE classified governance, will have great significance for the SOE comprehensive reform and classified governance.