Unemployment insurance take-up rates in an equilibrium search model

被引:12
|
作者
Auray, Stephane [1 ]
Fuller, David L. [2 ]
Lkhagvasuren, Damba [3 ]
机构
[1] ENSAI, ULCO, CREST Ensai, Campus Ker Lann Rue Blaise Pascal BP 37203, F-35712 Bruz, France
[2] Univ Wisconsin, 800 Algoma Blvd, Oshkosh, WI 54901 USA
[3] Concordia Univ, CIREQ, H1155-19 1455 Maisonneuve Blvd West, Montreal, PQ H3G 1M8, Canada
关键词
Unemployment insurance; Take-up; Calibration; Matching frictions; Search;
D O I
10.1016/j.euroecorev.2018.11.005
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
From 1989 to 2012, on average, 23% of those eligible for unemployment insurance (UI) benefits in the US did not collect them. To understand the implications of these "unclaimed" benefits, we develop a directed search model with an endogenous UI take-up rate. In equilibrium, UI collectors have longer unemployment durations relative to non-collectors. The difference results from two forces, a consumption effect and a private information effect, as UI collection histories are unobservable. We characterize both effects analytically and quantitatively. With an endogenous take-up rate, the unemployment rate and average duration of unemployment respond significantly slower to changes in the UI benefit level, relative to the standard model with a 100% take-up rate. The private information effect on non-collector job finding rates plays an important role in this result. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:1 / 31
页数:31
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