Strongly Unforgeable Certificateless Signature Resisting Attacks from Malicious-But-Passive KGC

In digital signature, strong unforgeability requires that an attacker cannot forge a new signature on any previously signed/new messages, which is attractive in both theory and practice. Recently, a strongly unforgeable certificateless signature (CLS) scheme without random oracles was presented. In this paper, we firstly show that the scheme fails to achieve strong unforgeability by forging a new signature on a previously signed message under its adversarial model. Then, we point out that the scheme is also vulnerable to the malicious-but-passive key generation center (MKGC) attacks. Finally, we propose an improved strongly unforgeable CLS scheme in the standard model. The improved scheme not only meets the requirement of strong unforgeability but also withstands the MKGC attacks. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to prove a CLS scheme to be strongly unforgeable against the MKGC attacks without using random oracles.