Assessment of the independence of regulatory agencies of the electric power, telecommunications and oil sectors in Brazil

This article proposes new parameters and indicators to evaluate the levels of formal and de facto independence of regulatory bodies. The target is the agencies of the electricity, telecommunications and oil sectors in Brazil. The study is guided by two theoretical perspectives: the need for independence of the regulatory bodies, as political interference can increase risks and inhibit private investment, especially in infrastructure sectors; and the influence of institutions, present in each sector and in each country, on the new institutional designs. This is a descriptive research that identified differences in institutional designs not captured by conventional methodologies, such as the regulatory governance index proposed by the World Bank. The results confirm the greater resistance to changes in the energy sectors: less formal independence of regulatory agencies and more active presence of political authorities in the regulatory field of these sectors. Besides, the indexes confirm that the three agencies do not have autonomy to manage their revenues. This limitation on de facto independence occurs mainly at the stage of the budget proposal.